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Abstract 
 
Extensive multilingualism is one of the most important and fundamental principles of 
the European Union. However, a large number of official languages (currently 23) 
hinders communication and imposes substantial financial and legal costs. We address the 
merits of multilingualism and formulate an analytical framework to determine the 
optimal number of official languages in the EU. Using the results of a 2005 
Eurobarometer survey of languages in the EU 27, we first derive the sets of languages 
that minimize aggregate linguistic disenfranchisement of the Union’s citizens for any 
given number of languages. We then proceed by discussing the political-economy 
framework and feasibility of a potential linguistic reform in the EU under alternative 
voting rules. We argue that a six-language regime would be a reasonable intermediate 
choice: a lower number of official languages results in excessive linguistic 
disenfranchisement whereas adding further languages increases the costs but brings only 
limited benefits. We also show that even though a linguistic reform reducing the number 
of official languages to six is unlikely to gain sufficient support at the present, this may 
change in the future since young people are more proficient at speaking foreign 
languages.  
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“-    I don’t speak English. Kurdish I speak, and Turkish, and gypsy 
language. But I don’t speak barbarian languages.  
  -    Barbarian languages?  
  -     English! German! Ya! French! All the barbarian.”  
Yasar Kemal, quoted by P. Theroux, The Great Railway Bazaar. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
Public policies concerning linguistic diversity in various countries and international 
organizations increasingly appear at the forefront of public debate. Linguistic issues and, 
in particular, the treatment of minority languages are almost unparalleled in terms of their 
patriotic and emotional appeal. As was pointed out by Bretton (1976, p. 447), “language 
may be the most explosive issue universally and over time. This is mainly because 
language alone, unlike all other concerns associated with nationalism and ethnocentrism 
… is so closely tied to the individual self. Fear of being deprived of communicating skills 
seems to raise political passion to a fever pitch.”  
The prevalence of multi-lingual societies and their challenges are well-documented 
over the course of the human history. A well known example is the Rosetta Stone1, a 
religious stone-set decree issued in Ptolemaic Egypt in 196 BC and inscribed with three 
scripts (Hieroglyphic, Demotic Egyptian and Greek), each of which addressed a different 
group: government officials, local population and priests. Multilingual societies are, 
however, by no means a thing of the past. The latest version of the Ethnologue database2 
lists 6,912 distinct languages spoken all over the world. Since there are only 271 nations, 
dependencies and other entities, a large number of countries, if not most, should be 
therefore multi-ethnic and multilingual. Even though many of these nearly seven 
thousand languages are spoken in small and often remote and isolated communities, 
ethnic heterogeneity is not exclusively a third-world phenomenon. In Western Europe, 
for example, despite a long tradition of the nation-state, most countries are multilingual, 
and there is a plethora of indigenous regional languages such as Welsh in the UK, 
Catalan and Basque in Spain, Provençal and Breton in France or Frisian in the 
Netherlands. 
                                                 
1 The Rosetta Stone is at display at the British Museum in London. See 
http://www.thebritishmuseum.ac.uk/compass/ixbin/goto?id=OBJ67.  
2 http://www.ethnologue.com/.   
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The policy of official multilingualism in the EU represents a crucial link between 
the EU institutions and its citizens. The Treaty of Rome and Regulation 1/1958 stipulates 
that all EU languages are to be treated on an equal basis with respect to publication of 
official EU documents and that EU citizens have the right to communicate with EU 
institutions in an EU language of their choice (see also Schaerer, 2002). However, with 
the growing number of member countries and official languages, multilingualism 
increasingly enters the political debate in the EU. A notable example of this is the 
opening speech to the European Parliament by Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands who 
said: “I am addressing you today in Dutch. At the same time, I am convinced that 
cooperation in Europe will increasingly demand concessions of us in this field. Unless we 
want to turn the European Union into a Tower of Babel, we shall have to make every 
effort to understand each other as clearly as possible.”3  Although, as pointed out by 
Laponce (1992, pp 599-600) “like religion, language does not lend itself easily to 
compromise,” a functional multilingual society requires willingness on behalf of the 
participating linguistic groups to make compromises and to accept some sort of linguistic 
standardization. Indeed, the need for linguistic standardization is recognized by a 
majority of the citizens of the European Union: in a recent EU-wide survey carried out in 
all its 27 member countries, 54 percent of the population “tend to agree” that the 
European institutions should adopt one single language to communicate with European 
citizens and 69 percent “tend to agree” that everyone in the EU should be able to speak a 
common language.4  
The main objective of this paper is to discuss the challenge of linguistic 
standardization faced by the EU as well as the possible remedies and their political and 
economic impact. Linguistic standardization entails an important trade-off between the 
benefits and cost. On the one hand, standardization can deliver important benefits in 
terms of improved communication, increased trade, enhanced economic performance and 
administrative efficiency. On the other hand, language standardization restricts the 
linguistic rights of some groups, which, in line with Ginsburgh and Weber (2005), we 
refer to as linguistic disenfranchisement. The effects of not including some languages in 
                                                 
3 Address by Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, 26 
October 2004. See http://www.koninklijkhuis.nl/content.jsp?objectid=4096 for the original (Dutch) version 
and http://www.koninklijkhuis.nl/content.jsp?objectid=4099 for the English translation of the speech.  
4 See Special Eurobarometer 255 (2006), question 11.   
   4
the set of the official ones5 go beyond restricting access to information. Citizens 
prevented from communicating in the language of their choice may be unwilling or 
unable to fully participate in the political process. Furthermore, given that EU law takes 
precedence over national legislation, the citizens’ ability to receive information and to 
communicate in their own language has profound and direct implications for the 
economic and social fabric of the society and individual well-being. In an extreme case, 
linguistic disenfranchisement may even threaten the long-term of survival of some 
languages. 
To address the potential impact of linguistic standardization in the EU, we assess 
the relative importance of European languages by examining disenfranchisement as 
reflected in linguistic proficiency (or lack of thereof) of EU citizens. Our analysis is 
based on a unique and comprehensive survey data set on languages and their use. This 
Eurobarometer survey6 was commissioned by the Directorate General for Education and 
Culture of the European Commission and it is the first such survey to cover and ask 
identical question in all current member and candidate countries of the EU. The data 
were collected in November-December 2005. The respondents were queried about their 
mother tongue and other languages that they speak “well enough to have a conversation”, 
allowing them to list up to three languages. The respondents were asked also to assess the 
quality of their linguistic skills. Since the surveys are nationally representative, we can 
use them to estimate the number of people speaking the various languages across the EU.  
We focus on disenfranchisement that would result if the set of EU official 
languages were limited to a particular single language or a combination of languages. 
Specifically, we formulate a procedure for selecting subsets of official languages from 
among all eligible languages so as to minimize the disenfranchisement rate. We 
implement this procedure for different numbers of official languages so that the 
“optimal” sets satisfy the sequencing principle:  the optimal pair contains the single 
optimal language, the optimal triple contains the optimal pair, and so on. We further 
augment our analysis by using the notion of distance between languages. Both 
sequencing and linguistic proximity are important: some languages are more widely 
                                                 
5 See Appendix 1 for the difference between the terms “official”, “working” and “procedural” language, 
and the rules followed by the various bodies of the EU. 
6 Special Eurobarometer 255 (2006).   
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spoken outside of their countries than others and some pairs or groups of languages are 
relatively similar while others are very different. We then test which of these subsets 
would be supported by the Council of the EU under the application of the qualified 
majority voting (QMV) as stipulated by the Nice Treaty. We show that the number of 
official languages would have to be relatively large: depending on the extent of linguistic 
disenfranchisement deemed as tolerable, between three and eleven official languages 
would be required in order to meet all three QMV criteria. A possible recommendation 
would be to compensate those countries whose languages are not chosen, as suggested by 
Fidrmuc and Ginsburgh (2006). This would allow them either to implement their own 
preferred translation and interpretation regimes (possibly on a different scale than the 
current EU regime) or to forego linguistic services altogether and instead divert the 
compensation transfers to alternative uses. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a broad view of 
language use and linguistic policies in the European Union while in Section 3 we analyze 
multilingualism and disenfranchisement in the EU and formulate criteria for finding 
possible subsets of official languages. Section 4 uses the provisions of the Nice Treaty, of 
the European Constitution and of the Penrose Law to analyze which type of linguistic 
reform could pass under the application Qualified Majority Voting (though, at present, 
linguistic regime requires unanimity). Section 5 is devoted to concluding remarks. 
 
2  Multilingualism and Linguistic Standardization  
The challenges encountered by multilingual societies include issues such as linguistic 
standardization, promotion or suppression of languages, political and economic impact of 
such policies and their fairness.7 Linguistic standardization may be necessary to prevent 
communication from becoming excessively costly, complicated or outright impossible. A 
public policy entailing concessions and compromises, however, necessarily imposes 
restrictions on the linguistic rights of some segments of the society. While linguistic 
standardization may deliver important benefits in terms of increased trade, enhanced 
economic cooperation and improved communication, it inevitably raises the problem of 
                                                 
7 See Van Parijs (2005).  
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linguistic disenfranchisement (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005), since it restricts the 
linguistic rights of some groups within a society.  
The EU proudly asserts that its “policy of official multilingualism as a deliberate 
tool of government is unique in the world. The EU sees the use of its citizens’ languages 
as one of the factors which make it more transparent, more legitimate and more 
efficient.”8 The potential implications of restricting multilingualism at the EU level 
would go well beyond the relatively narrow circle of national and EU officials, MEPs, 
lobbyists and people associated with the various think-tanks, consultancies and law firms 
dedicated to European integration. EU directives set (minimal) standards for legislation 
that EU member countries are obliged to implement subsequently into their national legal 
frameworks within a set time limit. Even more importantly, EU regulations and decisions 
become effective directly and immediately as soon as they are adopted by the EU (and 
translated into all official languages). Hence – unlike directives – regulations and 
decisions do not have to be implemented into the national legal framework and can even 
overrule national laws. Similarly, rulings issued by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
have immediate legal effect (once they are published in all official languages) and can 
overrule national laws or earlier decisions of national courts. Therefore, if the EU were to 
introduce a reduced set of official languages, EU regulations, decisions and ECJ rulings 
would be legally binding in all member countries even if they are not translated into all 
member countries’ national languages.  
Furthermore, changes in linguistic policies at the EU level would have also 
important intangible implications. Having one’s language recognized as an official 
language of the EU may evoke feelings of national pride and patriotism, boost the 
country’s international recognition, encourage the learning of that language by foreigners 
and help develop literary and cultural traditions in it. In officially bilingual countries, the 
fact that a language is being used in communication with EU institutions may encourage 
its wider use also by national authorities.9 On the other hand, taking away the official 
status from a language may discourage the speakers of that language from participating in 
the political process at the EU level.  
                                                 
8 See the EU web portal “Languages and Europe” at http://europa.eu.int/languages/en/home.  
9 Maltese is said to have benefited from this effect. A similar effect may materialize for Irish now that it 
has been given official status as well.   
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There is, however, an important difference between the implications on social, 
economic and political participation and those that relate to national pride and patriotism. 
A person whose language is not accepted as an official EU language can still get (nearly) 
all social, economic and political benefits if she speaks one of the official languages or 
(to a lesser degree) if the list of official languages includes a language that is sufficiently 
close to her own language. But her sense of national pride would nonetheless be 
adversely affected. In our analysis, we focus on the former type of effects, for which 
proficiency in other languages is crucial. Considering the latter type would make our 
analysis trivial and uninteresting: all that matters is whether one’s language is in or out; 
all other considerations are irrelevant.  
Table 1 gives an overview of the official languages spoken in the European Union 
in its current form ( i.e. a union with 27 member countries). The lower part of the table 
lists some additional languages spoken in Europe: those that have been proposed as 
contenders for the official-language status (Basque, Catalan and Galician), the languages 
of the candidate countries (Croatian and Turkish) and those of the main immigrant 
communities (Russian, Arabic and the languages of the Indian sub-continent). Columns 
(1)-(2) report the number of native speakers of each language, both in the native country 
or countries (for instance, German in Austria and Germany, English in the UK and 
Ireland) and in the EU as a whole (denoted as ‘All’). Columns (3)-(4) provide a similar 
count that includes both native and nonnative speakers of each language, again 
distinguishing between the native countries of the language and all EU countries. 
Columns (5)-(6) restrict these numbers to those who are either native speakers or who 
assess their linguistic skills as being good or very good. Finally, columns (7)-(8) present 
worldwide numbers as estimated by Crystal (2001). 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
Some general remarks are in order. First, the table clearly shows that cross-boarder 
mobility is limited in the EU: English, French, German, Hungarian, Polish, Portuguese 
and Spanish are the only languages with more than half a million native speakers outside  
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their native countries.10 Second, as expected, English, French, German and Spanish are 
the most widely spread languages: the numbers of those who speak them well or very 
well (column 6) are, respectively, 2.9, 1.6, 1.4 and 1.4 times larger than the numbers of 
native speakers (columns 2). Some other languages also seem to be well-known. Russian, 
a non-official and indeed a non EU language is the mother tongue of some 4.2 million 
EU27 citizens but 22 million EU citizens speak it well or very well (including the 4.2 
million native speakers). On this measure, it is the eighth largest language in the EU, 
after English, (183 million), German (122 million), French (97 million), Italian (65 
million), Spanish (54 million), Polish (41 million) and Dutch (24 million) and just ahead 
of Romanian (22 million).11 While six or seven languages dominate in the EU, English is 
clearly a step ahead of the others and, furthermore, “globalization proceeds in English” 
(De Swaan, 2001, p. 186). This is highlighted by the fact that English is the most widely 
spoken language in EU and globally: according to Crystal (2001), 1.5 billion people 
speak English worldwide. 
Allowing multiple official languages is costly.12 The EU15 was spending some 
EUR 686 million annually13 on translating and interpreting services. In the wake of 
enlargement, this cost has risen to 1,045 million.14 At the outset of the European 
integration process, meetings involving six countries with four languages were relatively 
simple and manageable. With each enlargement, the combinations of languages requiring 
                                                 
10 In case of Hungarian, this includes large indigenous populations of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and 
Romania.  
11 The accession of Turkey would add 73 million speakers of Turkish, catapulting that language to the 
fourth position.  
12 The Treaty of Rome and Regulation 1/1958 recognized Dutch, French, German and Italian as official 
languages. Danish, English, Finnish, Greek, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish were added at later stages. 
The latest enlargement in 2004 resulted in the addition of Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, 
Maltese, Polish, Slovak, Slovene. Irish was given the same status in 2005 but it was agreed that the 
decision would be implemented only as of January 2007. Bulgarian and Romanian have become official 
languages of the EU as of that date as well, in the wake of their countries accession to the EU. All these 
languages enjoy the same privileges as the original four. Without a reform, the list of official EU languages 
is likely to grow even further as more countries enter the EU: at present, Croatia and Turkey are the only 
candidates for membership but in the future they may be joined by the other countries of West Balkan. 
Turkish may become an official EU language not only due to Turkey’s accession but also as a result of the 
re-unification of Cyprus. Furthermore, as has happened for Irish, languages that currently enjoy national or 
regional official status in their own countries without being used at the EU level can eventually become 
official EU languages. A number of other languages such as Luxembourgish, Catalan, Basque, Welsh or 
Russian, may therefore follow suit.  
13 Unofficial estimates are even larger. Le Monde, November 30, 1999, put the cost at 1.8 billion euros! 
14 Included in this figure are 807 million for translation of written documents and 238 million for 
interpretation of oral statements. See European Commission (2005 a,b).  
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translations grew. At present, with EU membership having grown to 27 and the number 
of languages to 23, providing translation and interpretation services is not an easy task. In 
practice, increasing costs have been kept in check by scaling down the scope of services 
provided. The new DG Translation selects the documents that need translation into all 
languages and those that do not.15 EU bodies increasingly use relay translations (that is, 
translating a text or speech first into one of the procedural languages and then translating 
the resulting text again into the target language) or two-way translations (into and out of 
a principal language). The downside is that relay and two-way translations can result in 
misunderstanding, misrepresentation or outright errors, so that revisions by a mother-
tongue speaker of the target language are often necessary (Lönnroth, 2006). The issue of 
validity of legal documents is also important; national delegations may agree on a text 
prepared in a single language such as English, even though it is the translated text that is 
eventually incorporated into national law and becomes legally binding.16  
Though any change in the EU linguistic policy requires unanimity (Article 217 of 
the Treaty of Rome), not all languages are equally often used by the various EU bodies. 
This practice is based on Article 6 of the same Treaty stating that “the institutions of the 
Community may stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are to be 
used in specific cases.” This allowed each institution to adopt its own internal rules, 
which typically favor English, French and German as the so-called procedural 
languages.17 These are used for day-to-day communication within the EU bureaucracy 
and for preparing drafts of official documents. The vast majority of all EU documents are 
prepared in English (62 percent in 2004), French (26 percent) and German (3 percent), 
with the remaining languages accounting for some 9 percent of all inputs. In February 
2005, the Commission went even further by suggesting to limit the automatic 
                                                 
15 “The highest priority is given to legal acts and similar documents which have major legal or financial 
implications...[There is a distinction] between core documents, which should in principle be translated in-
house, and non-core documents which can be outsourced...[There are] strict guidelines on the maximum 
length of different types of documents...Finally...two thirds of the documents are written in English...[and] 
authors now work in a language which is not their own.” (Lönnroth, 2006). 
16 The Treaty of Rome established the principle of ‘equal authenticity’ of treaties and legal documents 
adopted by the EU, whereby each translated version is considered correct and legally binding (see 
Athanassiu, 2006). An interesting example relates to the name of the single European currency. The French 
translation of the Maastricht treaty left it as the European Currency Unit (ECU) while the German text 
indicated it should be called Europäische Währungseinheit (EWE). As a result, the name ECU had to be 
abandoned and the new round of negotiations lead to the birth of the Euro.   
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interpretation of its press conferences to English, French and German, which raised 
immediate protests by Italian and Spanish officials and journalists. 
Until the enlargement in May 2004, full multilingualism and simultaneous 
interpretation were the rule in the European Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee, and at the plenary sessions of the European Parliament. In preparatory 
meetings of the Council, a system of interpretation upon request has been implemented 
recently. While simultaneous interpretation is used in the Parliament, its members were 
asked to use simple sentences and to avoid jokes. Full multilingualism is also used in 
contacts between the EU and its citizens and all official documents are translated into all 
member states’ languages. However, ministerial meetings on topical issues and 
diplomatic meetings are interpreted into the three procedural languages only (Truchot, 
2003, p. 102). Of the approximately 4,000 meetings held every year (before the last two 
enlargements), 75 percent did not require simultaneous translation (Truchot, 2003, p. 
102).18  
Other international organizations tend to be more restrictive with respect to the 
languages that they endorse. While the official languages at the United Nations since 
1973 have been Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish, and Arabic, its bureaucracy 
uses mainly English and French.19 Speeches given in one of the official languages are 
translated into the remaining official languages only. Delegates who wish to address the 
UN Assembly in any other language can do so only if they arrange translation into one of 
the official languages.20 English is the language used by the OECD, NATO, IMF, Word 
Bank and other international organizations. However, those organizations are not 
necessarily relevant for the EU, since none of them has any ambition of political 
integration. 
Multilingualism also can have important drawbacks. In May 2004, for example, the 
implementation of new directives on financial regulation and transparency of securities 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 The European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank, which use French and English, 
respectively, as their working languages are the main exceptions to this practice.  
18 See Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of the rules governing the use of languages in the 
various EU institutions. 
19 In 2001, official representatives were asked in which language (English, French or Spanish) they wanted 
to receive their emails. Out of the 185 members who replied, 126 chose English (including 14 from French 
speaking countries), 39 French and 20  Spanish (Calvet, 2002, p. 154). 
20 See http://www.un.org/Depts/DGACM/faq_languages.htm.   
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information had to be delayed because they were not translated in time.21 As the EU has 
expanded in the meantime, the directives had to be translated into nine additional 
languages, necessitating a delay of six months. In 2003, the EU along with other rich 
countries agreed to allow developing countries to import cheap generic medication to 
treat diseases such as HIV, malaria and tuberculosis. The implementation of this decision 
was delayed by more than a year because of the need to translate it into all 20 official 
languages.22 Another compelling case concerns patent applications filed with the 
European Patent Office (EPO), both in terms of cost and speed.23 By filing out an 
application in English, French or German, it is possible to obtain protection in all 31 EPO 
member countries. However, once the patent is granted by the EPO, it must be validated, 
translated into each language of the country where the firm wants to be protected, put in 
force and renewed in each national system. Translation costs alone for the 13 frequently 
cited countries24 are estimated at 13,600 euros, while the total filing for 20 years costs 
129,000 euros (the same filing costs 16,500 euros in the US and 17,300 euros in Japan). 
But as Van Pottelsberghe and François (2006) point out “the total cost is not the only 
issue.” They show that both the incoming workload of examiners and their output is three 
to four times higher in the US than at the EPO. The length of the procedure is 27 months 
in the US and 49 months in Europe. As a consequence, the number of claims (a patent 
application is composed of on average 7 claims in Japan, 18 in Europe and 23 in the US) 
amounts to 1 million in Europe, 3 millions in Japan and 8 millions in the US, though the 
European market is the largest.  
 
3  Effects of Reducing the Number of Languages 
In Section 2, we reviewed the costs and practical challenges posed by the extensive 
multilingualism embraced by the EU. In this section we turn to potential solutions that 
could help alleviate or avoid these challenges by reducing the number of official 
languages. The current status-quo in the EU is that over 90 percent of the written 
                                                 
21 See “A Welcome Break,” Wall Street Journal Europe, May 17, 2004, p. A8). 
22 See “EU Language Barrier Costing Lives,” The Guardian, 28 July 2004. 
23 The reader is referred to the very comprehensive paper by Van Pottelsberghe and François (2006) from 
whom we borrow this information. 
24 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK.   
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documents are drafted in English, French or German and most of those are subsequently 
translated into some or all of the remaining languages, including languages that have a 
small number of speakers, or languages of populations that often would be able to 
understand a language other than their own. This suggests that the choice of official 
languages should take into account the number of citizens who speak each language, its 
use in other countries where it is not a native language as well as its linguistic proximity 
to other languages.  
 
3.1  Linguistic Disenfranchisement  
Linguistic disenfranchisement (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005), quantifies the number of 
citizens who would lose their ability to communicate if their language would not belong 
to the group of official languages. Let Λ be the current set languages spoken in the EU. 
For any subset T of Λ, disenfranchisement in country j, d 
j(T), can be defined as: 
() T v n T d
j j j − = ) (  (3.1) 
where n
 j is the population of country j and v
 j(T) is the number of country j’s citizens who 
speak at least one of the languages in T. When comparing disenfranchisement across 
countries, it is more convenient to express it in terms of disenfranchisement rates: 
()
j
j j
j
n
T v n
T D
−
= ) (  (3.2) 
If the set T consists of a single language l, the expression above reduces to the evaluation 
of disenfranchisement rate for an individual language: 
D
j(l) =
n
j − v
j l ()
n
j  (3.3) 
However, when examining disenfranchisement rates, one can also take account of 
the linguistic proximity between languages and the externalities that this proximity may 
generate. Clearly, if two languages are close, as for example German and Dutch, a Dutch 
person (who does not speak any foreign languages) will be better off if German becomes 
an official language rather than French. Such a Dutch person would find it relatively easy 
to understand and speak German or would be able to learn it easily. Similarities between 
languages therefore may be important and should not be ignored when analyzing 
linguistic policies. Disenfranchisement can be reduced not only by choosing a language 
that is spoken by many but also by choosing one that, due to linguistic proximity, would  
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be understood by many. We can derive formulae analogous to (3.2)-(3.3) that take into 
account linguistic distances. To keep the notation simple, we assume here that every 
individual in country j speaks the native language of that country and ignore intermediate 
languages that the individual speaks in addition to his native language that might be 
closer to one of the languages in T than the individual’s native language. Then, if l
 j
(T) 
represents the language in T that is closest to the native language in j, and γ(j, l
 j
(T)) is the 
linguistic distance between the two languages, (3.2) can be rewritten as  
 
  () () () () () T l j T v n T d
j j j
j
,
~
γ − =  (3.4) 
 
and the disenfranchisement rate adjusted for distance becomes 
 
  () ()
j
j
j
n
T d
T D
~
~
=  (3.5) 
 
The EU-wide disenfranchisement rate, D(T), can be derived analogously.  
Most European languages have common Indo-European roots, though they may 
have branched off at different points in time. Indo-European languages have been the 
object of close scrutiny for a very long time, leading to the construction of language trees 
determining the timing of separations between languages and divergence times.25 
Distances between pairs of Indo-European languages have been computed by Dyen, 
Kruskal and Black (1992), and those for the EU Indo-European languages are 
summarized in the tree represented in Figure 1. The main language groups are clearly 
delineated: Romance languages (Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Romanian), 
Germanic languages (German, Dutch, Swedish, Danish and English), Slavic languages 
(Slovak, Czech, Slovenian, Polish and Bulgarian) and, somewhat isolated, Greek, and 
Baltic Languages (Lithuanian and Latvian).26 Within the first three groups, there are also 
                                                 
25 It is thought that the Indo-European peoples originate from Central Russia, with the earliest evidence of 
their presence dating back to the 5
th millennium BC. The break-up into the present-day linguistic families is 
estimated to have been completed by 3000 BC. See Diamond (1992) and the references cited therein.  
26 The tree does not include Estonian, Finnish, Hungarian, which belong to the Ugro-Finnic group and 
Maltese with its Semitic roots.  
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sub-groups formed by languages that are particularly close to each other as shown by 
language dissimilarity measured on the vertical axis. Given the special place of English, 
both in terms of its remoteness from the other members of the Germanic group and its 
worldwide spread, we can place English in a separate linguistic group. Accordingly, we 
categorize EU languages into eight distinct groups, the first six of which are Indo-
European: (1) Romance languages, (2) Germanic languages, (3) English, (4) Slavic 
languages, (5) Baltic languages, (6) Greek, and the two groups of non Indo-European 
languages: (7) Ugro-Finnic languages (Hungarian, Finnish and Estonian) and (8) 
Maltese. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Table 2 exhibits the disenfranchisement rates for the main and most widely spread 
languages in the individual EU27 countries.27 The results allow us to make several 
observations. Firstly, even though English is the most widely known language, it would 
leave 62.6 percent of EU27 citizens disenfranchised if it were the only official language. 
Moreover, there are only seven countries were less than 50 percent of the population 
would be disenfranchised. But the EU-wide disenfranchisement rate rises to 75.1 and 
80.1 percent if English were replaced by German or French, respectively, and it would be 
even worse if Italian or Spanish were chosen (86.7 and 88.9 percent, respectively). 
Secondly, all disenfranchisement rates are larger for the remaining candidate countries, 
Croatia and Turkey, indicating that disenfranchisement would be even higher in the 
future EU29. Thirdly, with the exception of English, German, French, Italian and 
Russian, no language is spoken by more than five percent of the population in more than 
two European countries. Finally, though Russian is not an official language, it 
disenfranchises fewer people in the EU27 than many official languages: Bulgarian, 
Czech, Danish, Estonian, Finnish, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, 
Portuguese, Slovak, Slovenian and Swedish (detailed disenfranchisement figures for 
these languages are available upon request). 
 
                                                 
27 The notion of disenfranchisement rate that we use is relatively strict: it comprises not only those who do 
not speak the language in question but also those who say that they only have a basic knowledge of it.   
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Insert Table 2 
 
It is often thought that the younger generations are more fluent in languages. Table 
3 reports disenfranchisement rates for four age groups (15-29, 30-44, 45-59, over 60) for 
the nine main languages (English, German, French, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Dutch, 
Turkish and Russian). Clearly, English is the only language for which 
disenfranchisement rates are significantly lower among the younger generations. Detailed 
country by country results28 show that this is the case in all 29 countries, though in 
almost half of these (Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey), disenfranchisement rates are 
still larger than 50 percent even among the youngest generation. Overall, if English were 
the only EU language, disenfranchisement would nevertheless drop from 62.6 percent to 
44.6 percent in the EU27 and to a little more than 50 percent in the EU29 if the whole 
population were as knowledgeable in English as is the youngest generation. Therefore, 
one could expect that some 40 years from now, English would be known by more than 
half of the population of the EU27 and nearly half of the EU29. The same cannot be said 
about French, German and the other languages reported in Table 3, as the shares of 
respondents proficient in them is roughly the same irrespective of age. Note that though 
Russian is well-known in Europe, its use does not increase among the younger 
generations.29  
 
Insert Tables 3  
 
3.2  Disenfranchisement-minimizing Sets of Official Languages in EU27 
Determining the set of official languages for a multilingual society entails, implicitly or 
explicitly, a cost-and-benefits analysis. In particular, the society must weigh the benefits 
of multilingualism (reducing or avoiding linguistic disenfranchisement) against its costs. 
The latter go beyond the monetary costs of maintaining several parallel languages: 
communication is more cumbersome when speakers of different languages interact with 
                                                 
28 Detailed results for individual countries are available upon request. 
29 This is mainly due to the fact that the knowledge of Russian is decreasing in the former Eastern bloc 
countries.  
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each other, the need to translate official documents results in delays and the costs due to 
misunderstandings or erroneous translations are all important as well. However, if the 
costs depend only on the number of chosen languages, the search for an optimal linguistic 
regime boils down to achieving the lowest possible disenfranchisement with a given 
number of languages. The analysis that follows is concerned with choosing subsets of 
languages that minimize overall disenfranchisement in such a framework.  
Formally, let m≤n be a positive integer, where n is the number of languages under 
consideration for official status. Denote by Tm the subset of Λ that minimizes the 
disenfranchisement rate over all sets with m languages, i.e. 
 
  () () T D T D
m T T m = Λ ⊂ =
: min  (3.6) 
 
We can then construct the sequence of optimal sets {T1,T2,…,Tn}. Obviously, Tm 
may not be unique. However, this problem does not arise in our analysis: at least for 
small values of m, this sequence satisfies the sequencing principle. Namely, Tm-1⊂Tm for 
every m and there exists an ordering of languages {l1,l2,…,lm} in Λ such that 
 
  Tm = {l1,l2,…,lm} (3.6) 
for every m. 
Though this calculation is conceptually simple, in practice it would require a large 
number of computations for large values of m. However, since European languages differ 
considerably in the numbers of people who speak them, the scope of the analysis can be 
narrowed down substantially. For instance, it is clear that English should be introduced 
first, followed by French or German, then the other large languages (Italian, Spanish and 
Polish) and so on. In this way, identifying the most suitable combination is often easy 
and at any stage in the analysis the number of possibilities to be considered is relatively 
small.  
Panel A of Table 4 reports the resulting sequence. The sequence includes only the 
official languages of the EU27; the only exception to this is Russian included for 
comparison purposes as it is widely spoken in several new member countries. The 
sequence is presented in a way whereby each column indicates which language should be  
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added to the subset formed by the languages reported in the preceding columns so as to 
minimize dienfranchisement. The optimal subset of one language, T1, therefore contains 
English, T2 contains English and German, T3 is formed by English, German and French, 
and so on.30 The marginal contribution of each additional language to reducing 
disenfranchisement falls under one percent of the EU population once m exceeds 13 and 
the differences between marginal contributions attributable to the various candidate 
languages are often minute. Therefore, in the remainder of our analysis, we will only 
consider the first 13 languages: English, German, French, Italian, Spanish, Polish, 
Romanian, Hungarian, Portuguese, Czech and Greek (tied at the tenth position), 
Bulgarian, Dutch.31 
 
Insert Table 4  
 
English is clearly the first language in any sequence as it is spoken well or very 
well by one third of the EU27 population. German and French are in close race for the 
second position; German, with a 49.3 percent disenfranchisement rate, fares better than 
French with 50.6 percent. This triple leads to a disenfranchisement rate of 37.8 percent. 
Italian, Spanish or Polish would each make almost the same contribution to reducing 
disenfranchisement further, with Italian slightly ahead of the other two languages. 
Spanish, in turn, performs only marginally better than Polish at the fifth position. With 
the six largest languages included, 16 percent of the EU population would still remain 
disenfranchised. Adding Romanian brings the residual disenfranchisement rate further 
down to 13 percent.  
Of course, important differences across countries remain, with several countries 
facing disenfranchisement rates in excess of 50 percent: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, and Slovakia. The most 
dramatic case is Hungary where only 16 percent of the population can speak one of the 
first seven languages. Not surprisingly, Hungarian becomes the eighth language in the 
                                                 
30 Note that there are several instances when two or three languages result in approximately the same 
reduction in disenfranchisement at a particular step in the sequence. For example, the tenth language could 
be Czech, Greek or Russian. Taking Czech as the tenth language, Greek then appears again as the eleventh 
language. Swedish, Slovak and Danish appear twice within the sequence for the same reasons.   
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sequence. In addition to eliminating disenfranchisement in Hungary, this has a positive 
impact also on Slovakia whose disenfranchisement rate declines from 70 to 57 percent. 
Portuguese is the ninth language, followed by Czech and Greek tied in the tenth position 
(along with Russian). Finally, the sequence is concluded by Bulgarian and Dutch. Of 
course, adding further languages brings more gains but these are small and as a rule 
limited to a single country. With 13 official languages (as opposed to the current 23), the 
EU-wide disenfranchisement rate would be 4 percent.  
Adding the next 6 languages (Finnish, Swedish, Lithuanian, Slovak, Latvian and 
Danish) would lower disenfranchisement to 1 percent. Any of the remaining four 
languages (Slovene, Estonian, Maltese and Irish) would lower the disenfranchisement 
rate by no more than 0.2 percent. Note that the objective of this exercise is to minimize 
disenfranchisement in the current EU and therefore the candidate countries and their 
languages are not considered. As a consequence, Croatia and especially Turkey are left 
with very high disenfranchisement rates.  
These disenfranchisement rates are a snapshot of the situation at the time of the 
survey (i.e. the end of 2005). However, the knowledge of languages changes over time. 
In particular, the pattern of learning foreign languages may change both with respect to 
languages that are popular and the frequency with which people learn other languages. 
Indeed, Table 3 shows that the youngest generations of Europeans are more likely to 
speak foreign languages, and especially English. Therefore, we calculated a sequence of 
optimal sets based on the disenfranchisement rate of the youngest generation (15 to 29 
years old) only. This sequence is presented in Panel B of Table 4. 
The first difference is that German which was second to enter in the previous 
sequence is replaced by French. This is due to the fact that among the younger generation 
in Germany and in Austria, 60 percent know English so that German becomes less 
necessary. Beyond the first two languages, the sequence is essentially the same as before, 
and includes English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Romanian, Hungarian, 
Portuguese and Czech (using the same criterion as before, that a language’s contribution 
to reducing disenfranchisement should be at least 1 percent). The disenfranchisement rate 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 The rest of the sequence would be formed by Finnish, Swedish, Lithuanian, Slovak, Latvian and Danish. 
Afterwards, the contribution of the remaining languages to reducing disenfranchisement is negligible.   
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that would prevail among the youngest generation with these ten languages is essentially 
the same as with 13 languages among the EU population as a whole: 3.9 percent.  
So far, we have discussed disenfranchisement assuming languages are chosen only 
based on the number EU citizens who speak them. Some languages, however, are very 
close to each other: Danish and Swedish, Spanish and Portuguese, Dutch and German, 
and Czech and Slovak are the most notable examples (see Figure 1). Since these 
languages are so similar to each other, the speakers of either one would benefit from the 
introduction of the other language even if their own language remains left out, both with 
respect to understanding spoken work and when receiving written documents. Therefore, 
an alternative approach would involve choosing relatively dissimilar languages in order 
to increase the chance that any EU citizen can at least partially understand one of the 
official languages.32 
Panel C of Table 4 reports the results of an exercise that takes into consideration 
distances between languages.33 In constructing the sequence, individual 
disenfranchisement at each stage is adjusted proportionately to distance to the closest 
language among those already included in the sequence. In the single-language (English-
only) scenario, accounting for linguistic proximity reduces the EU-wide 
disenfranchisement considerably, from 62.6 to 43.1 percent. Adding French reduces 
disenfranchisement also in all Romance-language countries, bringing the EU-wide rate to 
24 percent. A deviation from the two sequences reported above is that Polish now comes 
in the third position ahead of German. Italian is the fifth language followed by Hungarian 
and Spanish. Greek ties with Romanian for the eighth position. The requirement of at 
least 1 percent contribution to reducing disenfranchisement cuts off the sequence at nine 
languages with the resulting disenfranchisement rate 2.9 percent.  
                                                 
32 This idea was introduced by Ginsburgh, Ortuno-Ortin and Weber (2005). 
33 The distance between two languages is based on the number of words (from a given list of words) that 
are cognate, i.e. that descend from a common ancestral word. Such distances are often criticized since they 
do not take into account words that have more or less recently been borrowed from another language. 
English and French, for example, share many words that have been borrowed from each other. However, 
Janson (2003, pp. 157-158) points out that though “90 percent of the words in an English dictionary are of 
French, Latin or Greek origin, [i]f one counts words in a text or in a recording of speech, the proportion of 
Germanic words is much higher, for they are the most frequent ones, while most of the loans that figure in 
a dictionary are learned, rare items.”  
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These three sequences of sets which minimize EU27’s global rate of 
disenfranchisement will be used in our analysis of political feasibility of linguistic 
reform. 
 
3.3 Attitudes of EU25’s Citizens Towards Languages 
Before proceeding to the political constraints on the official set of languages, it is 
instructive to consider the attitudes of EU27 citizens towards linguistic issues and 
individual languages. The patterns are mixed. On the one hand, 54 percent of the EU27 
population tend to agree that the European institutions should adopt a single language to 
communicate with European citizens, 69 percent think that all Europeans should speak a 
common language and 83 and 49 percent believe that everyone should be able to speak 
one or two languages, respectively, in addition to their mother tongue. On the other hand, 
72 percent also think that all languages should be treated equally (see Table 5). Hence, a 
clear majority of Europeans holds a generally pragmatic attitude towards linguistic 
policies, recognizing that ensuring effective communication may require either that the 
EU would use a single language or that EU citizens must learn and use foreign languages. 
At the same time, however, a clear majority also supports equal treatment of all 
languages.  
Another interesting question is concerned with “which two languages, apart from 
your mother tongue, do you think are the most useful to know for your personal 
development and career”. Details are given in Table 5 for the four languages that are 
cited by more than 15 percent of the EU27 population. The languages that are considered 
useful by non-native speakers are English (67 percent), French (25 percent), German (22 
percent), Spanish (15 percent). These are followed by Russian (3.4 percent, cited almost 
exclusively in post-communist countries), Italian (3.2 percent) and Chinese (1.5 percent). 
Beyond that, usefulness drops to less than one percent. 34  
 
Insert Table 5. 
 
                                                 
34 The following languages were mentioned by more than 0.5 but less than 1 percent: Arabic (0.7%), 
Dutch (0.7%), Portuguese (0.5%), and Swedish (0.5%).   
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A further insight on attitudes towards potential linguistic reform can be gained by 
means of a regression analysis. Table 6 reports results of logistic regressions, with the 
above-discussed attitudes as dependent variables. The explanatory variables include basic 
socio-economic characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, education, occupation 
and residence in rural vs urban area. In addition, we include also the respondents’ height 
and body mass index (BMI, we also include a squared term for this indicator) as proxies 
for respondents income and social class.35 Finally, we also include a measure of self-
declared political orientation.  
Several interesting patterns stand out. Individuals with secondary or tertiary 
education or those who are still students are less likely to agree that the EU should use a 
single language and that all languages should be treated equally. They are more likely to 
agree, however, that everyone should speak one or two language in addition to their 
mother tongue. Similarly, those with managerial occupations are less likely to endorse a 
single language for the EU and equal treatment for all languages and, along with white-
collar workers, are more likely to agree that everyone should learn one additional 
language. Apparently, those with higher education and/or higher skills are more in favor 
of multilingualism and, somewhat surprisingly, less in favor of equal treatment of all EU 
languages. A similar pattern emerges for height and BMI.36 Given that we use height and 
BMI as proxies for income and social class, these results are consistent with those for 
education and occupation.  
 
Insert Table 6. 
 
4  Political Feasibility of Linguistic Reform 
The tools introduced in the preceding subsections can be used to identify which subsets 
of official languages would enjoy sufficient political support. A closer examination of 
                                                 
35 The literature on physical stature (see Steckel, 1995) finds that differences in height can be largely 
attributed to the quality of nutrition and health care in early infancy and again during adolescence: well-off 
children receive better quality of both food and health care and therefore grow into taller adults.35 
Similarly, weight relative to height as measured by the body-mass index (weight in kilograms divided by 
height in meters squared) typically displays a U-shaped correlation with income: both those with relatively 
low and high BMI are typically less well off (put differently, well off individuals are less likely to be either 
malnourished or overweight or obese).  
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disenfranchisement rates, distances between languages and optimal sets shows that not all 
languages play an equally important role within the EU. At the same time, it is clear that 
a unique official language will hardly be sufficient as it would result in too high an extent 
of disenfranchisement, leaving over 60 percent of the EU population ‘in the dark’. 
Similarly, a solution based on English, French and German, would still leave 38 percent 
of the EU population disenfranchised (26 if we adopt a forward-looking approach and 
consider the young generation only, 17 percent if we consider linguistic proximity), 
which many would see as unacceptably high. Moreover, implementing a single or a 
limited number of official languages would leave the majority of many countries 
disenfranchised. On the other hand, the status quo with extensive multilingualism 
resulting (at present) in 23 official languages is, to say the least, not very efficient. 
The decision on the set of official languages is inevitably a political one and boils 
down to deciding what extent of disenfranchisement is tolerable. All European countries 
accept a certain degree of disenfranchisement (regional languages in particular are often 
neglected) and it would be natural for the EU to do likewise. Whether the optimal set 
should contain one , six or more languages, however, is difficult to justify.  
Before the Nice Treaty, most EU decisions were made by unanimity. While the 
Nice Treaty extended the range of issues for which qualified majority voting (QMV) is 
used, the EU language regime remains subject to the unanimity rule. As a result, Malta 
and Estonia have the same weight as Italy and Poland, despite their vastly different 
populations. Similarly, Maltese and Estonian, at least in theory, enjoy the same status 
within the EU as Italian and Polish. While this emphasis on national interests is 
understandable (and indeed unavoidable) given the institutional framework adopted by 
the EU, it is also inherently undemocratic. In the context of linguistic policies, it implies 
that a Maltese or Estonian citizen weighs in more heavily than a Pole or Italian. 
Furthermore, as the EU expands, agreement by unanimity becomes increasingly 
difficult37 and therefore the EU has been gradually moving towards greater application of 
QMV. Hence, if the EU is to avoid becoming overwhelmed with dozens of languages, it 
                                                                                                                                                 
36 Taller respondents are less likely to agree that the EU should use a single language or that everyone in 
the EU should speak a common language. Both those who are relatively tall and those with an intermediate 
BMI are less likely to endorse equal treatment of all EU languages. 
37 See, for example, Baldwin et al. (2004).   
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may have to shift the emphasis from national concerns to those of individual citizens; this 
would also enhance the democratic legitimacy of EU policies. 
Decision making on linguistic reform under unanimity is trivial: any country set to 
lose out in the wake of the reform would need to be sufficiently compensated in order to 
throw its support behind the reform proposal. QMV, on the other hand, is analytically 
more complex and indeed interesting as it necessitates that countries form coalitions in 
favor or against the reform. Therefore, and in line with the trend towards wider 
application of QMV, we now examine under which conditions a linguistic reform could 
pass, assuming that QMV is used.38  
Under QMV, each member state has a fixed number of votes, with an EU-wide 
total of 345. For a decision to pass, the following three requirements apply: (a) the 
proposal must backed by a majority of states (14 out of 27), (b) it must be supported by 
248 out of the 345 votes, and (c) the states backing the votes must represent at least 62% 
of the EU population (i.e. 303 million). 
Formally, let Q be a collection of all subsets in the EU that satisfy all three QMV 
criteria. Obviously, if a subset of countries J belongs to Q, then every other subset J’ that 
contains  J also belongs to Q. Now for every set of official languages T and 
disenfranchisement rate r, denote by W(T,r) the set of countries whose 
disenfranchisement rate, given T, does not exceed r: 
 
  W(T,r)={j∈EU:D
j(T)≤r} (4.1) 
 
Obviously, the set W(T,r) is increasing with respect to inclusion and with respect to 
the value of r. That is, if T⊂T’ then W(T,r)⊂W(T’,r) for every r and for every set of 
languages T, W(T,r) ⊂W(T,r’) whenever r<r’. For our analysis it is important to identify 
the pairs (T,r) for which the corresponding set of countries W(T,r) satisfies all three QMV 
criteria, that is W(T,r)∈Q. 
                                                 
38 The QMV rules that we apply are those stipulated by the Nice Treaty which are the ones currently in 
effect. These rules were to be modified by the Constitutional Treaty. The latter’s ratification, however, was 
abandoned in the wake of negative verdicts of the French and Dutch referenda. As a consequence, the Nice 
Treaty rules are set to remain in effect potentially indefinitely.   
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Using the sequences of languages derived in Section 3.2, for every value of the 
disenfranchisement rate r we define the minimal number of languages m*(r)  that 
guarantees that the set of countries W(Tm*(r),r)satisfies the QMV criteria: 
 
m*(r) = min{m :W(Tm,r)∈Q}        ( 4 . 2 )  
 
Column (2) of Table 7 presents the results of our calculations for the three 
sequences discussed in Section 3.2 based on all respondents (Panel A of Table 4), young 
generation aged 15-29 only (Panel B of Table 4), and all respondents, accounting for 
distances between languages (Panel C of Table 4).39 
 
Insert Table 7. 
 
Consider for instance the first case in which all respondents are taken into account. 
Assume that representatives of the countries for which the chosen set of languages results 
in a disenfranchisement rate smaller than or equal to 20 percent would vote for the 
proposal. Then 14 (more than one half of the 27) countries would vote in favor of 9 
languages (E, GE, FR, IT, SP, PL, RO, HU and PT); these 9 languages would obtain 254 
votes (that is more than 248) and the countries would comprise 399 million citizens (that 
is more than 303 million). The proposal meets QMV and would be accepted. So would 
the proposal for disenfranchisement rates that are larger than 20 percent, but the proposal 
would fail if countries consider the 20 percent disenfranchisement level as being too 
large. 
Overall, the results show the following: 
(i)  All respondents. A linguistic reform would be possible if it maintains between 
seven (English, German, French, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Romanian) and 
eleven (the previous ones plus Hungarian, Portuguese, Czech and Greek) 
official languages, for between 40 and 10 percent acceptable rates of 
disenfranchisement, respectively). 
                                                 
39 Detailed results are available upon request.   
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(ii)  Young generation aged 15-29 only. Between three (English, French, German) 
and seven (English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Polish and Romanian) 
official languages would be required to make the reform politically feasible 
(again depending on which rate of disenfranchisement is seen as acceptable). 
(iii)  All respondents, accounting for distances between languages. For low rates of 
disenfranchisement (less than 10 percent), seven languages are needed: 
English, French, Polish, German, Italian, Hungarian and Spanish); three 
languages, English, French and Polish, would do if a disenfranchisement rate 
of 30 percent were deemed acceptable. 
The new Constitution (which was rejected in referenda held by France and the 
Netherlands) stipulates that the principle of voting by qualified majority will generally be 
applied but member states will have the possibility of exercising veto over foreign policy, 
defense and taxation issues. A new QMV rule replaces the Nice rule. The Constitution-
Treaty QMV rules require at least 55 percent of the members of the Council, comprising 
at least 15 of them and representing member states comprising at least 65 percent of the 
population of the Union. Column (3) of Table 7 shows that the minimal number of 
languages acceptable under the Constitutional QMV rules would be roughly of the same 
order of magnitude as under the Nice Treaty QMV.  
Both provisions, those of the Nice Treaty and of the European Constitution, assign 
too much power to some countries, while preventing others (in particular, middle-sized 
countries) from receiving their fair share of voting power. This deficiency in assigning 
voting weights can be rectified by the so-called square-root law of Penrose (1946) or 
simply, the Penrose law,40 which suggests that each country should be assigned a voting 
right proportional to the square root of its population. In column (4) of Table 7 we use 
Penrose weights. The shaded cells are those where a 62 percent majority vote for various 
disenfranchisement rates is obtained. This would allow restricting the number of official 
languages quite substantially and suggest that a regime with six official languages 
(English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Polish) would be accepted. 
 
                                                 
40 See also Laurelle and Widgren (1998).  
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5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we analyze the effects of linguistic policies and of a potential linguistic 
reform in the EU. The policy of official multilingualism is one of the most fundamental 
principles of the Union and is guaranteed by its treaties. Extensive multilingualism at a 
time when the EU is expanding its membership however translates into rapidly rising 
costs of translation and interpretation, which may have important human, legal and 
economic implications. Multilingualism is associated also with non-monetary costs such 
as delays in implementation of new laws and regulations, erroneous or confusing 
translations and potential conflicts arising from the fact that all translated versions of 
international treaties are considered legally binding even if they may occasionally lend 
themselves to different legal interpretations. Last but not least, the need for multiple 
translation and the associated delays and costs is a factor explaining why fewer patents 
are registered in Europe than in the US or Japan, thus potentially causing Europe to miss 
out on claims to valuable innovations and discoveries.  
Our analysis offers a formal framework to address the merits and costs of extensive 
multilingualism. First, for any given number of languages, we determine the set of 
languages that minimizes linguistic disenfranchisement across the Union. This allows us 
to construct a nested sequence of official languages, in fact, a menu of possible choices 
for a policy-making and for a potential linguistic reform.  
It is very unlikely, however, that all 27 member states would be unanimous (as 
currently required by EU law) in accepting to reduce the number of official languages, 
unless those populations whose languages are not part of the official language set are 
properly compensated.41 In this paper, we ask therefore what would be the minimal 
number of official languages required under three alternative voting rules: the qualified-
majority-voting provisions of the Nice Treaty, the proposed Constitutional Treaty or the 
Penrose law. It turns out that under the currently valid QMV rules (i.e. as stipulated by 
the Nice Treaty), the EU would need to maintain at least a seven-language regime. 
Moreover, this would be a feasible choice only if countries were ready to accept 
disenfranchisement as high as 40 percent. In the future, a slightly more restrictive six-
language scenario would also be feasible, requiring only a 30-percent disenfranchisement 
                                                 
41 See Fidrmuc and Ginsburgh (2006) for such a proposal and its consequences.  
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threshold. The official EU languages then would be English, French, German, Italian, 
Spanish and Polish.  
Note that in this group, there is at least one language belonging to each of the main 
branches of Indo-European languages (Romance, Germanic and Slavic). The language 
set excludes the small group of two Baltic languages (Latvian and Lithuanian), Greek, as 
well as the three non Indo-European languages (Finnish, Hungarian and Maltese). The 
fact that all large languages groups are represented implies that translations to the other 
languages belonging to the same group would be made somewhat easier. An oddity is the 
over-representation of Romance languages (French, Italian and Spanish). This results 
from the combination of two effects. First, the number of speakers of each of these 
languages in the EU is rather large. Second, the countries in which these three languages 
are native tend to ignore most other European languages (see Table 2).  
If implemented, the six-language scenario would result in relatively modest overall 
disenfranchisement of 16 percent. Adding more languages would lower 
disenfranchisement further but the gains attributable to each additional language would 
be small and limited to the native country of that language. Importantly, the six-language 
scenario could be seen as broadly consistent with the Europeans’ preference for linguistic 
pragmatism as well as equal treatment of languages (see Table 5): the languages included 
are all spoken in large EU member countries with populations of approximately 40 
million or more. If more languages were to be included, the next two should optimally be 
Romanian and Hungarian. That, however, would be difficult to justify: since Romanian 
would add a fourth Romance language and one spoken by only 21 million people while 
Hungarian is spoken by 12 million people (in Hungary and to some extent in Slovakia) 
while leaving out other languages spoken by similar numbers of people (most notably 
Dutch, spoken by 22 million). This group of six languages would be almost the same if 
account is taken of linguistic distances (Hungarian would be number 6, with Spanish 
relegated to the seventh place). Finally, an appropriate disenfranchisement rate to 
incorporate national pride considerations could be based entirely on the number of native 
speakers of each language.42 A sequence constructed based on this notion would 
obviously lead to the same optimal set, since the six languages belong to the most 
populated countries (and include German-speaking Austria and the 40 per cent of  
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Belgians whose native language is French). These countries account for 75.7 per cent of 
the EU population. 
It goes without saying that members of the European Parliament should be given 
the latitude to speak the official language of their country and no restriction should apply 
to them whatever the final reduced choice of the EU official languages. Therefore 
simultaneous interpretation from and to all official member countries’ languages should 
be continued. There is much less reason to continue this rule in other bodies (where it is 
in fact not always used in practice, see Appendix 1) or for translations of documents. 
Individual countries should have the opportunity to do this if they feel the need. This 
raises three questions: (a) where should the translations into official languages be 
performed; (b) which version of a document should be binding and (c) who should pay 
for the translation into those languages that will loose official status. It is reasonable to 
assume that the translations into the restricted set of official languages should be 
centralized at the Commission, and that these would be the binding versions in case of 
diverging legal interpretations.   
The amounts that are saved by the Commission, given that there will be less to 
translate could be transferred to those countries whose languages have lost official status. 
Fidrmuc and Ginsburgh (2006) suggest transferring the full cost (that is, roughly the total 
translation cost borne today by the EU, divided by the number of languages less one) to 
each country. Other ways of calculating the transfers (based on each country’s 
disenfranchisement rate for example) could be envisaged too. Each country would then 
have the liberty to use the transfer at its own discretion. The Commission would end up 
not saving on the cost of interpretation and translation but countries would be given the 
right incentives and possibly be held responsible for their own shortcomings. 
A linguistic reform, such as the one suggested in our paper, will change the 
incentives for acquiring skills in non-native languages. This will, in turn, change the 
dynamics, and the possibility to change the set of official languages after a certain 
number of years should be built into the basic Treaty or Constitution. 
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Table 1. Linguistic Groups in the EU27 and EU29 (in millions) 
  EU EU EU  Worldwide  Multiplier 
  Mother’s Tongue  All speakers  G and VG skills     
  Home All Home All Home All Native All  EU World 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (6)/(2)  (8)/(7) 
Official EU27             
Bulgarian  7 7.1  7.6 8 7.6  7.8  n.a. 9  1.10  
Czech  10  10.3 10.2 12.7 10.2  12  n.a.  12  1.17   
Danish  5.2 5.3 5.4 6.8 5.4 6.4  5  5.3  1.21  1.06 
Dutch  21.7 21.9 23.7 25.2 23.3  24  20  n.a. 1.10   
English  59.9 62.4 63.6 238 63.3  182.6 400 1500 2.93 3.75 
Estonian  1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.3  1  n.a.  1.08   
Finnish  5  5.2 5.2 6.1 5.2 5.7 4.7  6 1.10  1.28 
French  59.9 60.7 69.3 128 67.8 97.2  72  122 1.60 1.69 
German  83  85.3  89.9 147.9 89.6 121.7 n.a.  120  1.43   
Greek  11.7  12  11.8 14.1 11.8 12.9  12  n.a. 1.08   
Hungarian  10  11.9 10.1 13.5 10.1  13  n.a. 14.5 1.09   
Irish  0.4 0.6 0.8 1.2 0.6 0.9  0.03  n.a.  1.50   
Italian  55.8 57.7 56.9 71.6 56.8 64.8  57  63  1.12 1.11 
Latvian  1.7 1.7 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.2 n.a. 1.5  1.29   
Lithuanian  3  3.2 3.4 3.6 3.4 3.6 n.a.  4 1.13   
Luxembourgish  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 n.a.  1.00   
Maltese  0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 n.a.  1.00   
Polish  37.4 39.2 37.6 41.9 37.6 40.9 n.a.  44  1.04   
Portuguese  10.5 11.4 10.5 13.3 10.5 12.2 175  187 1.07 1.07 
Romanian  20.6  21  21.3 22.5 21.3 22.2  20  n.a. 1.06   
Slovak  4.7 5 5.3  7.8  5.2  7.2 5 n.a.  1.44  
Slovenian  1.9  2.2 2 2.9 2 2.8  2.2  n.a.  1.27  
Spanish  38.3 39.7 42.4 67.2 42.2 54.1 270  350 1.36 1.30 
Swedish  8.6 8.9  9 12.4 9 10.8  n.a.  9.3  1.21   
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Table 1. Linguistic Groups in the EU27 and EU29 (continued) 
  EU EU EU  Worldwide  Multiplier 
  Mother’s Tongue  All speakers  G and VG skills     
  Home All Home All Home All Native All  EU World 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (6)/(2)  (8)/(7) 
Other                  
Catalan  3.9 4.1 5.7 6.3 5.4 5.8  4  9 1.41  2.25 
Basque  0.7 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.1 1.3 0.6 n.a.     
Galician  2.2 2.2 2.9 3.1 2.9  3  3  n.a.     
Other  regional    4.3   18.8  13.8        
Croatian   0.6  2.1  1.7  4.8  n.a.    
Turkish   2.2  3.1  2.6  n.a.  59    
Russian    4.2   35.3  22.4  170  290  5.33  1.71 
Arabic   1.6  3.4  2.5  200  n.a.    
Indian  SC   1.3  3.2  2.6        
Other   1.8   16.1   6.3        
            
Notes: Columns (1)-(2) report the numbers of native speakers of each language in EU27, both in the native country or countries and outside the native countries, 
respectively. Columns (3)-(4) report the total number of persons who speak each language either as native speakers or because they learned it, again in the native 
countries and abroad, respectively. Columns (5)-(6) are analogous to columns (3)-(4) but only report those who are either native speakers or who assess their 
linguistic skills as good or very good (those with basic skills and those unable to assess their skills are not included). Finally, columns (7)-(8) contains worldwide 
numbers of speakers for each language according to Crystal (1999). Note that these are sometimes smaller than those given for more restricted areas in columns 
(1) to (12).  
The native countries for English are the United Kingdon and Ireland, German is attributed to Germany and Austria, France, Belgium and Luxembourg are taken 
at the native countries for French, Dutch is native in the Netherlands and Belgium, and Greek is native in Greece and Cyprus. We assume that Catalan, Basque 
and Galician are only native to Spain and Hungarian to Hungary (although sizeable ethnic Hungarian minorities live in Slovakia and Romania). Indian SC 
includes the languages of the Indian sub-continent: Hindi, Urdu, Punjabi, Gujarati, and Bengali. Indian SC languages, Arabic and Russian are assumed not to be 
native in any of the EU27 countries.  
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Table 2. Disenfranchisement in European Languages: Native and Foreign 
Languages, Respondents with Basic or No Linguistic Skills (in percent) 
    English German French  Italian  Spanish  Polish  Dutch  Turkish Russian 
           
Austria  55 1 94  95  98  100  100  99  99 
Belgium  59 87 29 97 97 99 32 99  100 
Bulgaria  84 94 96 99 99  100  100  90 75 
Cyprus  49 98 95 99 99  100  100  100  99 
Czech  Rep.  84 81 98  100  100  98  100  100  85 
Denmark  34 73 97 99 98  100  100  100  100 
Estonia  75  92  100 100 100 100 100 100  32 
Finland  69 95 99  100  100  100  100  100  99 
France  80 95  1  95 93  100  100  100  100 
Germany  62 1 92  99  98  98  100  98  92 
Greece  68 94 95 98  100  100  100  99 98 
Hungary  92  91 100 99 100  100  100  100 99 
Ireland  1  98  91 100 99  99 100  100  100 
Italy  75 96 90  3  97  100  100  100  100 
Latvia  85  97  100 100 100  99  100 100  15 
Lituania  86 96 99  100  100  87  100  100  26 
Luxemburg  61 12 11 95 99  100  99  100  100 
Malta  32 99 95 65 99  100  100  100  100 
Netherlands  23 43 81  100  97  100 1 100  100 
Poland  82 90 99 99  100 2 100  100  88 
Portugal  85 98 91 99 96  100  100  100  100 
Romania  86 97 90 98 99  100  100  100  98 
Slovak  Rep.  83 82 99  100  100  98  100  100  80 
Slovenia  59 79 98 91 99  100  100  100  100 
Spain  84 98 94 99  2 100  100  100  100 
Sweden  33 88 97 99 99  100  100  100  100 
United 
Kingdom  1  98 91 99 98  100  100  100  100 
           
EU27  62.6 75.1 80.1 86.7 88.9 91.6 95.1 99.5 95.4 
           
Croatia  71 85 99 93 99  100  100  100  99 
Turkey  94 98  100  100  100  100  100 2 100 
           
EU29  66.7 78.1 82.7 88.5 90.4 92.8 95.7 87.0 96.0 
                             
Notes: This table covers only the most widely spread languages in the EU27. Complete tables with all 
languages can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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Table 3. Disenfranchisement by Age Groups, EU27 and EU29 
                                  
 EU27  EU29 
  All  15-29 30-44 45-60 >  60  All 15-29 30-44 45-60 >  60 
                 
                                  
English  63  45 59 68  76  67  50 63 72  79 
German  75  74 75 76  75  78  77 78 79  78 
French  80  78 81 80  81  83  81 83 83  84 
Italian  87  87 87 87  87  89  89 88 88  89 
Spanish  89  87 89 90  89  90  89 91 91  90 
Polish  92  92 92 92  92  93  93 93 93  93 
Dutch  95  95 95 95  95  96  96 96 96  96 
Turkish  100  99 99  100  100  87  87 87 87  87 
Russian  95  96 95 95  96  96  97 96 95  97 
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Table 4. Disenfranchisement in the Sequence of Optimal Language Sets (in percent) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10a  10b  10c  11  12  13 
A. All respondents  EN 
1 + 
GE 
2 + 
FR 
3 + 
IT 
4 + 
SP 
5 + 
PL 
6 + 
RO 
7 + 
HU 
8 + 
PT 
9 + 
CZ 
9 + 
GR 
9 + 
RU 
10a+ 
GR 
11 + 
BG 
12 + 
NL 
                                               
EU27  62.6 49.3 37.8 29.5 22.4 16.4 12.9 10.9  9.2  7.7  7.7  7.7  6.2  5.0  4.0 
EU29  66.7 55.0 45.0 37.7 31.6 26.4 23.4 21.7 20.2 18.8 18.9 18.9 17.5 16.4 15.6 
                                               
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
     
B. Respondents under 
30  EN 
1 + 
FR 
2 + 
GE 
3 + 
IT 
4 + 
SP 
5 + 
PL 
6 + 
RO 
7 + 
HU 
8 + 
PT 
9 + 
CZ 
     
                  
EU27  44.6 34.5 25.8 19.9 14.4 10.4  7.8  6.3  5.1  3.9       
EU29  50.3 41.5 33.8 28.7  24  20.5 18.2  17  15.9 14.9       
                  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8a  8b  9 
   
   C. All respondents, 
adjusted for linguistic 
distance  EN 
1 + 
FR 
2 + 
PL 
3 + 
GE 
4 + 
IT 
5 + 
HU 
6 + 
SP 
7 + 
GR 
7 + 
RO 
7a + 
RO 
   
  
                  
EU27  43.1 24.0 16.6 11.4  9.0  6.9  5.2  4.0  4.1  2.9       
EU29  49.5 32.9 26.3 21.7 19.6 17.8 16.4 15.3 15.4 14.3       
                  
Notes: One language is added in each column, as indicated in the second row. In some columns (e.g. 10a, 10b and 10c in Panel A), two or more languages result 
in approximately the same percentage reduction in disenfranchisement. The sequence is continued until no language reduces disenfranchisement by more than 1 
percent of EU27 population. The languages included are all EU27 official languages and Russian. Russian is included for comparison only and does not enter the 
sequence as an EU language. Languages are abbreviated as follows: Bulgarian (BG), Czech (CZ), Danish (DK), Dutch (NL), English (EN), Finnish (FI), French 
(FR), German (GE), Greek (GR), Hungarian (HU), Italian (IT), Latvian (LV), Lithuanian (LT), Spanish (SP), Polish (PL), Portuguese (PT), Romanian (RO), 
Russian (RU), Slovak (SK), Swedish (SW). Panel A considers all respondents, Panel B only those 30 years of age or younger and Panel C considers all 
respondents but adjust the disenfranchisement rates to account for linguistic distance between languages. See text for more details.  
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Table 5. Attitudes on Linguistic Policies and Usefulness of Languages (in percent). 
 
Single 
EU 
Lang. 
Common 
Lang. 
One 
Add.. 
Lang. 
Two 
Add. 
Lang. 
Treat 
All 
Equally English German French Spanish 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Austria    47  60  75 44 76 19 73  2  15 
Belgium    59  75  92 60 72 68 83  9  54 
Bulgaria    34  43  70 27 70 28 65 34 11 
Cyprus    59  69  96 70 91 79 93 17 34 
Czech  Rep.  53  72  88 45 89 18 68 56  5 
Denmark    44  54  91 48 74 93 92 56  7 
Estonia    51  53  91 63 88 60 71 14  2 
Finland    36  45  77 41 78 92 86 18  8 
France    51  76  86 32 62 31 81 19  2 
Germany    62  78  86 36 62 20 81  5  27 
Greece    58  65  92 74 90 68 74 30 21 
Hungary    65  66  83 68 67 13 57 52  3 
Ireland    44  65  75 34 74 43  4  37 58 
Italy    55  62  84 67 74 28 82 15 25 
Latvia    58  63  92 65 69 39 70 17  3 
Lituania  56  71  89 69 86 24 85 27  4 
Luxemburg  48  71  89 52 71 41 37 60 82 
Malta    50  76  85 55 94 40 88  5  12 
Netherlands    48  75  90 35 61 89 93 48 19 
Poland    69  74  89 75 90 27 70 45  5 
Portugal    50  66  73 52 83 63 51  5  31 
Romania    46  56  70 37 69 61 63 18 33 
Slovak  Rep.  44  61  84 31 78 22 70 60  4 
Slovenia    54  50  80 47 87 77 79 61  4 
Spain    56  71  79 63 69 26 72 11 32 
Sweden    41  60  90 27 71 94 96 39 12 
UK    48  69  79 49 80 47  4  29 63 
             
EU27  54.3  69.4  83.4 49.4 72.3 37.5 67.3 22.3 25.0 
             
Croatia    51  54  83 42 81 72 77 53  4 
Turkey    50  70  80 64 81 26 83 40 10 
             
EU29  53.8  69.3  82.9 51.1 73.5 36.3 69.4 24.9 22.9 
Notes: Columns (1) through (5) report percentages that tend to agree with the following statements: “The European 
institutions should adopt one single language to communicate with European citizens,” “Everyone in the European 
Union should be able to speak a common language,” “Everyone in the European Union should be able to speak one 
language in addition to their mother tongue,” “Everyone in the European Union should be able to speak two 
languages in addition to their mother tongue,” and “All languages spoken within the European Union should be 
treated equally.” Columns (6) to (9) report the percentages that mentioned each language in response to the question 
“Which two languages, apart from your mother tongue do you think are the most useful to know for your personal 
development and career?”. Only languages that were mentioned by at least 15 percent of the EU27 population are 
included.  
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Table 6. Determinants of Attitudes on Linguistic Policies. 
  Single EU Lang.  One Common Lang.  One Add.. Lang.  Two Add. Lang.  Treat All Equally 
Female  -0.098 (2.31) 0.019 (0.42) 0.240 (3.77) 0.000 (0.01) 0.037 (0.67) 
Age  -0.011 (1.72) -0.033 (4.95) -0.014 (1.42) 0.002 (0.34) -0.012 (1.53) 
Age  sqrd  0.0001  (1.71) 0.0003  (4.53) 0.0002  (1.97) 0.0001  (1.09) 0.0001  (1.30) 
Married  0.019 (0.56) 0.108 (2.98) 0.039 (0.73) -0.074 (2.08) -0.087 (1.96) 
Left-Right  0.042 (5.83) 0.023 (3.03) 0.021 (1.85) 0.022 (3.00) -0.058 (6.06) 
Sec.  education  -0.109 (2.37) -0.002 (0.04) 0.226 (3.45) 0.033 (0.70) -0.272 (4.20) 
Tert.  Education  -0.321 (6.29) -0.065 (1.20) 0.382 (5.01) 0.102 (1.93) -0.657 (9.59) 
Still  student  -0.262 (3.06) 0.053 (0.57) 0.607 (4.40) 0.216 (2.43) -0.766 (6.84) 
Self-employed  -0.081 (1.28) -0.029 (0.44) 0.228 (2.31) 0.031 (0.46) -0.101 (1.21) 
Manager  -0.110 (1.91) 0.066 (1.09) 0.346 (3.70) 0.091 (1.52) -0.351 (4.99) 
White  collar  0.017 (0.31) 0.028 (0.46) 0.239 (2.71) -0.065 (1.12) -0.093 (1.28) 
House  person  0.006 (0.09)  0.070 (0.98) -0.112 (1.17) -0.009 (0.13) -0.094 (1.03) 
Unemployed  0.026 (0.34) 0.055 (0.68) -0.019 (0.17) 0.001 (0.02) 0.108 (0.99) 
Retired  0.200 (3.34) 0.122 (1.93) 0.081 (0.93) 0.015 (0.24) -0.124 (1.57) 
Height    -0.008 (3.33) -0.007 (2.92) 0.004 (1.20) -0.003 (1.35) -0.010 (3.25) 
BMI  0.031 (1.78) 0.020 (1.23) -0.007 (0.57) 0.002 (0.15) 0.039 (3.41) 
BMI  sqrd  0.000 (1.34) 0.000 (1.26) 0.000 (0.07) 0.000 (0.02) -0.001 (3.21) 
Small/medium  town  0.024 (0.66) 0.095 (2.44) 0.120 (2.19) 0.064 (1.72) -0.029 (0.62) 
Large  town  0.009 (0.23) 0.041 (0.97) 0.229 (3.70) 0.148 (3.59) -0.164 (3.21) 
Country  Dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Constant  1.406 (2.71) 2.570 (4.73) 1.065 (1.45) 0.388 (0.77) 3.080 (5.02) 
            
N  18784   18976   19175   18634   18665  
Wald  chi2  687.430 0.00  825.640 0.00  465.370 0.00  1808.500 0.00  1174.400 0.00 
Pseudo  R2  0.028   0.037   0.037   0.079   0.076  
Notes: This table reports the results of logit regressions where the dependent variables correspond to the attitudes on linguistic policies reported in columns (1) 
through (5) of Table 7a. The omitted categories are: male, not married (single, divorced, widowed or cohabitating), primary education or less, manual worker, 
and living in rural area. Left-right is a self-declared measure of political orientation ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). Height measures how tall 
the respondent is (in centimeters). BMI is the body-mass index (weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared). Height and weight are self-declared.  
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  Table 7. Minimal Number of Languages m* Satisfying QMV 
  for Given Disenfranchisement Rate r 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
  m*(r) m*(r)  m*(r) 
 r  Nice  Treaty  Constitution  Penrose 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
All respondents  10  11  11  8 
 20  9    10  7 
 30  8    9  6 
 40  7    6  6 
 50  7    4  5 
 
Respondents under 30  10  7   7  6 
 20  7    5  5 
 30  6    4  5 
 40  6    4  4 
 50  3    3  3 
 
All repondents and   10  7   7  6 
accounting for distances  20  5   4  5 
 30  3    3  2 
 40  3    2  2 
 50  3    2  2 
________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 1 
The tree of Indo-European Languages Used in EU 27 
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Note. 1 = Romanian, 2= Italian, 3 = French, 4 = Spanish, 5 = Portuguese, 6 = German, 7 = Dutch,  
8 = Swedish, 9 = Danish, 11 = English, 12 = Lithuanian, 13 = Latvian, 14 = Slovene,  
15 = Czech, 16 = Slovak, 17 = Polish, 18= Bulgarian, 19 = Greek (10 = Norwegian).  
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